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Baker: The Codification of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Supplemen

THE CODIFICATION OF PENDENT AND
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION:
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Federal court practitioners will find 28 U.S.C. § 1367,1 entitled Supplemental Jurisdiction, an essential new tool of the trade that "broadly
authorizes the district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
additional claims." 2 Section 1367 enables the federal court practitioner
to join a nonfederal claim with a federal jurisdiction worthy claim when
the claims are "so related ... that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 3 The

new statute promotes judicial efficiency by eliminating the need for trials
at both the state and federal levels. Furthermore, section 1367 codifies

three judicially efficient case law doctrines that have perplexed many students, practitioners, courts, and even scholars: pendent claim,4 pendent
party,' and ancillary 6 jurisdiction. Section 1367 merges the three doctrines into one codified heading, supplemental jurisdiction. The openings
1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991) (effective Dec. 1, 1990). Section 1367 is a codification of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
See S. REP. No. 101-416, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6803, 6804
("The purpose of [the Judicial Improvements Act] is to promote for all citizens-rich or poor, individual or corporation, plaintiff or defendant-the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil
disputes in our Nation's Federal courts.").
2. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860,
6874 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 101-734].
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). See John B. Oakley, Recent
Statutory Changes in the Law of FederalJurisdictionand Venue" The JudicialImprovements Acts of
1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 735, 757-69 (1991).
4. Pendent claim jurisdiction permits a plaintiff to attach state law claims to federal claims,
even though diversity is absent, if the "state and federal claims... derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
5. Pendent party jurisdiction allows the attachment of a nonfederal claim against a nonparty
to a federal claim when the federal claim is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts only. Stewart
v. United States, 716 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984). Stewart was
superceded by Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). Finley was superceded by 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1367 (West Supp. 1990).
6. Ancillary jurisdiction is a
judicially developed concept based on the premise that a district court acquires jurisdiction
over a case or controversy in its entirety and, as an incident to the disposition of a dispute
that is properly before it, may exercise jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the
case over which it would not have jurisdiction.
6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTMCE & PROCEDURE § 1444, at 316 (2d ed. 1990).
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to federal jurisdiction that a practitioner can carve with supplemental
jurisdiction provide the focus of this paper.
II.

INDEPENDENT FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The topic of supplemental jurisdiction requires an understanding of
independent federal jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction technically de-

mands two things, a constitutional basis and statutory authorization
from Congress.7
The constitutional basis originates in Article III, Section 2, of the
United States Constitution. Section 2 specifies what types of cases the
federal courts are permitted to hear.' The three most common areas of
federal jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2 are: cases arising under
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States (federal ques-

tions); controversies in which the United States is a party; and controversies between citizens of different States (diversity of citizenship). 9

Various statutory underpinnings exist for these three types of cases.
Statutory authorization for federal question jurisdiction"0 and diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction1 is found in title 28, the Judiciary Code. The
Federal Tort Claims Act, 12 supplemented by various other statutes, gov-

erns when the United States may be sued. a In theory, if a claim fitting
one of the constitutionally-provided categories lacks statutory support
for federal jurisdiction, it will not proceed in federal court.14

In reality, the development of the case law doctrines of pendent
claim and ancillary jurisdiction demonstrates an erosion of the strict stat-

utory requirement for attaining federal jurisdiction. 5 Pendent claim jurisdiction permits a plaintiff to join state law claims with federal claims,
See John H. Garvey, The Limits ofAncillary Jurisdiction, 57 TEx. L. REV. 697 (1979); George B.
Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdictionof Federal Courts of Persons Whose Interest May Be Impaired If Not
Joined, 62 F.RD. 483 (1974). See also Michael T. Riddell & John H. Davis, Ancillary Jurisdiction
and the JurisdictionAmount Requirement, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 346 (1974).
7. FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.2, at 49 (3rd
ed. 1985).
8. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
9. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 7, § 2.2, at 49.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
13. See, Le-, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1988) (United States as a defendant); 28 U.S.C. 1491 (1988)
(contract actions against the United States).
14. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 7, § 2.2, at 49.
15. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375 (1978) (concept of ancillary
jurisdiction includes compulsory counterclaims, cross-claims, and impleader); United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (federal courts allowed discretion to invoke pendent jurisdiction of
state claims if they are brought together with substantial federal claims and are derived from a
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even though the complete diversity of citizenship requirement 16 has not
been met for the state claims, if the "state and federal claims ... derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact."' 7 Numerous pendent claim
holdings have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. 8 The
concept of ancillary jurisdiction has operated similarly to weaken the
requisite of statutory authority.' 9 Finley v. United States2' rekindled a
strict reliance on statutory authorization and struck down the doctrine of
pendent party jurisdiction. 2 ' Therefore, the post-Finley federal court
practitioner had to rely on the doctrines of pendent claim or ancillary
jurisdiction to attach a supplemental claim to an independent federal
claim when statutory authority was absent.
III.

PRE-SECTION 1367 CASE LAW RESTRICTIONS ON PENDENT
AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION

Through the years, numerous Supreme Court cases have defined
and refined the notions of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.2 2 In some
instances, the Court expanded the boundaries of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction.2 3 The boundary line for pendent jurisdiction was significantly increased with the United States Supreme Court's decision in
common nucleus of operative facts); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933) (federal copyright infringement claim and state unfair competition claim permitted to proceed in federal court together
because each was considered a part of a single cause of action); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
213 U.S. 175 (1909) (federal due process claim provided court with jurisdiction over state claim that
statute did not allow commission to issue rates); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860)
(origin of ancillary jurisdiction).
16. Diversity of citizenship requirement is addressed in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806).
17. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
18. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715; Hurn, 289 U.S. 238; Siler, 213 U.S. 175.
19. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 7, § 2.7, at 61-62 ("[Ihe concept of ancillary jurisdiction is
that the federal court, having jurisdiction of the action between the original parties, may hear and
determine claims between those parties and other parties when the other claims are closely related to
those already before the court. The concept is the product of decisional law rather than statute
20. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
21. Id. at 549, 553-55.
22. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976); Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715; Freeman v. Howe,
65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
23. See Freeman, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450. Plaintiff from New Hampshire filed suit in a Massachusetts federal court to recover damages from defendant railroad company incorporated in Massachusetts. In accordance with attachment procedures, Federal Marshall Freeman seized a number of
railroad cars as security for a potential judgment. A second Massachusetts plaintiff; Howe, was a
mortgagee of the defendant. He secured a writ of replevin for the same railroad cars from a state
court. While the railroad cars were still in the possession of the federal marshall, Howe removed
them under the writ of replevin. The court held that Howe was not without remedy in the federal
courts even though he and the defendant were both citizens of Massachusetts. The court reasoned
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United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.24 At other times, the Court has tightened
the boundaries. 2 Two dramatic tightenings occurred with the Supreme
Court's decisions in Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger26 and
27

Finley v. United States.

The plaintiff in Owen Equipment brought a wrongful death action in
federal court basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. The original
defendant impleaded Owen Equipment and Erection Company as a
third-party defendant and then the plaintiff filed her own claim against
Owen Equipment. 2 The original defendant was granted summary judgment and Owen Equipment was left the sole defendant. It was subsequently discovered that the plaintiff and defendant, Owen Equipment,
were citizens of the same state.2 9 The Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1) requires complete diversity of citizenship. Therefore, a
federal court in a diversity case may not assume ancillary jurisdiction
when the third-party defendant's citizenship is identical with the plaintiff's.3 1 As outlined in the analysis of section 1367 that follows, section
that Howe could have filed a bill in equity in the court that issued attachment. Such a bill would not
have been an original suit, "but ancillary and dependent, supplementary merely to the original suit
out of which it had arisen, and is maintained without reference to the citizenship or residence of the
parties." Id. at 460. The claim would therefore have been within the jurisdiction of the court. In
Gibbs, plaintiff brought an action in federal court, asserting both a federal claim, under the Management Relations Act, and a state claim, conspiracy to interfere with a contract. The court held that
federal courts have jurisdiction to assume pendent jurisdiction of state claims if they are brought
together with substantial federal claims and are derived from a common nucleus of operative facts.
24. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
25. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. 1. Plaintiff brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging
her dismissal from a civil service position. Counties are not "persons" subject to civil rights suits in
a federal action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 11-12. See infra note 100 for pertinent text of
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff sought to add a claim against the county through pendent jurisdiction.
The court held that where Congress expressly indicates that it will not confer jurisdiction over a
particular party in a federal action, pendent jurisdiction cannot be used against the excluded party.
Thus, this decision narrowed pendent jurisdiction boundaries. However, the Court also indicated
that pendent party jurisdiction would be allowed where, as under the Federal Torts Claim Act,
federal jurisdiction is exclusive and a refusal to allow pendent party jurisdiction would require suits
in state and federal court. Id. at 11-12. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (rejecting the
Aldinger suggestion of pendent party jurisdiction in such cases); Owen Equipment,437 U.S. 365. See
also infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
26. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
27. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
28. Owen Equipment, 437 U.S. at 367 (pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)).
29. Id. at 368-69.
30. Id. at 373-74. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) for the well established requirement of complete diversity of citizenship.
31. Owen Equipment, 437 U.S. at 377. The Court did not abolish ancillary jurisdiction entirely.
The availability of ancillary jurisdiction depends on the context in which the nonfederal claim is
asserted:
[I]n determining whether jurisdiction over a nonfederal claim exists, the context in which
the nonfederal claim is asserted is crucial ....
[Tihe claim here arises in a setting quite
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1367(b) codifies Owen Equipment's protection of the complete diversity

of citizenship requirement.32

33
A dramatic tightening of pendent jurisdiction came in Finley
34
where the plaintiff brought a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act
against the United States. One year later she attempted to amend her
federal complaint against the United States to include additional defend-

ants.35 Independent federal jurisdiction did not exist as to the claims
against the additional defendants because the claims were based on state
law, and diversity of citizenship was lacking.36 Finley held that pendent
jurisdiction would not be extended to the pendent party field.37

The Finley decision motivated Congress to react to the clear unwillingness of the Supreme Court to carry the concepts of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction any further. 8 Congress responded with section 1367,

entitled Supplemental Jurisdiction, which superceded Finley by allowing
pendent party jurisdiction. 9
different from the kinds of nonfederal claims that have been viewed in other cases as falling
within the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Id. at 375-76.
32. Evidence of congressional intent to codify Owen Equipment is found in H.R. REP. No. 101734, supra note 2, at 29 n.16. "The net effect of subsection (b) is to implement the principal rationale
of Owen Equipment ... " Id.
33. 490 U.S. 545. See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (pre-Finley suggestion regarding
pendent party jurisdiction).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
35. Finley, 490 U.S. at 546.
36. Id. at 550-52.
37. Id. at 556. Finley overruled a line of cases upholding pendent party jurisdiction. See Lykins v. Pointer Inc., 725 F.2d 645 (11th Cir. 1984); Stewart v. United States, 716 F.2d 755 (10th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984). But see Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir.
1977) (categorically rejected pendent party jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act), cert.
dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978).
38. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556 (Justice Scalia stressed that "[w]hat is of paramount importance is
that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may
know the effect of the language it adopts.").
39. Convincing evidence of congressional intent to erase Finley appears in the legislative history
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, supra note 2, at 28 (demonstrating Congressional
awareness that some lower courts read Finley as prohibiting previously accepted examples of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction). "Already, for example, some lower courts have interpreted Finley to
prohibit the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in formerly unquestioned circumstances." Id. The
enactment of section 1367 eliminated this confusion by providing statutory authority for pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction. "Legislation, therefore, is needed to provide the federal courts with statutory authority to hear supplemental claims." Id. The statutory authority provided by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 in essence removed the need for the case law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction,
allowing for more than the simple restoration of pre-Finley rulings.
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ANALYSIS OF 28 U.S.C. § 1367

A. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
Section 1367(a) governs supplemental jurisdiction for cases gaining
4
original federal jurisdiction from the involvement of a federal question. 0
Section 1367(a) states:
Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) or as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include
claims that involve
41
the joinder or intervention of additional parties.

Most of section 1367(a) leaves little room for interpretation. The
first few words of subsection (a) outline when subsection (a) is not triggered: "[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute.... ." Subsection (b) governs original actions founded solely on diversity of citizenship. Therefore, subsection (a) is not applicable to actions founded solely on diversity of
citizenship.
The use of the word "shall" in subsection (a) demonstrates the affirmative duty Congress intended to place on the courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
The last sentence of subsection (a)
unquestionably dispels the Finley rule prohibiting joinder of additional
parties. 42
One murky area exists in subsection (a) due to the following phrase:
"The district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution., 43 Whether a given dependent claim forms "part of the same case or controversy" may dominate
44
many of the arguments regarding the application of section 1367(a).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides federal question jurisdiction. Section 1367(a) applies to all cases
gaining original federal jurisdiction based in part on the constitutional foundations outlined in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, except diversity cases. Section 1367(b) controls
original federal jurisdiction founded on diversity.
41. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991).
42. Id.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. See infra notes 70-99 and accompanying text for analysis of cases decided under § 1367's
"case or controversy" language.
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B. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)
Section 1367(b) governs supplemental jurisdiction for cases basing
original federal jurisdiction solely upon diversity of citizenship.4 5 Section
1367(b) states:
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall
not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by
plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking
to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with
the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.46
The application of subsection (b) is a rather mechanical one. Original jurisdiction founded solely on diversity of citizenship automatically
triggers subsection (b). In such a case, a supplemental claim may be denied supplemental jurisdiction if it falls into any one of the following
categories:
1. The dependent claim is made by a plaintiff against someone
made a party under Rule 14, 7 19,48 20, 9 or 2450 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
2. The dependent claim is made by someone proposed to be joined
as a plaintiff under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 1
3. The dependent claim is made by someone seeking to intervene
as a plaintiff under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5"
45. Jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship is statutorily provided for in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1988).
46. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 14 (entitled Third-Party Practice, covering impleaders). Rule 14(a) governs when a defendant may bring in a third party. Rule 14(b) governs when a plaintiff may bring in
a third party. Rule 14(a) was utilized by the original defendant in Owen Equipment to join Owen as
a third party. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
48. FED. IR CIV. P. 19 (entitled Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication, providing for
compulsory joinder of parties). Rule 19(a) governs persons to be joined if feasible. Rule 19(b) governs determinations by the court whenever joinder is not feasible.
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 20 (entitled Permissive Joinder of Parties). The first sentence of Rule 20(a)
governs the permissive joinder of persons as plaintiffs. The second sentence of Rule 20(a) governs
the permissive joinder of persons as defendants. Section 1367(b) only exempts from supplemental
jurisdiction claims asserted by plaintiffs against defendants joined under Rule 20. Section 1367 does
not exempt from supplemental jurisdiction the permissive joinder of parties as plaintiffs under Rule

20(a).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (entitled Intervention). Rule 24(a) governs intervention of right. Rule
24(b) governs permissive intervention.
51. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991).
52. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991).
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Even if the supplemental claim fits into one of the above pigeon
holes, it is not automatically denied supplemental jurisdiction. Supplemental jurisdiction will only be denied if the supplemental claim fits into
one of the pigeon holes and "when exercising supplemental jurisdiction
over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332."" 3 In other words, jurisdiction will fail where
inclusion of the claim would destroy diversity of citizenship.
The House Report pertaining to section 1367 reflects congressional
desire to safeguard the diversity requirement in section 1367(b), preventing the manipulation of diversity of citizenship requirements.5 4 Section
1367(b) was intended to prevent parties who have gained original jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship from later adding non-diverse
parties under a claim of supplemental jurisdiction.
Section 1367(b)'s treatment of permissive joinder of parties under
Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is puzzling.5 5 The second sentence of Rule 20(a) addresses the joinder of parties as defendants:
"All persons... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is
asserted againstthem ... any right to relief in respect of or arising out of
the same transaction .
5....
6 Section 1367(b)(a) addresses this Rule 20
provision by expressly prohibiting supplemental claims that are asserted
by plaintiffs againstdefendants who are joined under Rule 20 if diversity
will be destroyed.5 7
Interestingly, section 1367(b) does not address the first sentence of
Rule 20 which allows for the joinder of parties as plaintiffs: "All persons
may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief.., in
respect of or arising out of the same transaction .. ."I' Therefore, a
literal reading of section 1367(b) would allow supplemental claims by
nondiverse plaintiffs that are joined under the first sentence of Rule 20(a)
".

53. Id.
54. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, supra note 2, at 29, which states in pertinent part:
In diversity-only actions the district courts may not hear plaintiffs' supplemental claims
when exercising supplemental jurisdiction would encourage plaintiffs to evade the jurisdictional requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by the simple expedient of naming initially only

those defendants whose joinder satisfies section 1332's requirements and later adding
claims not within original federal jurisdiction against other defendants who have intervened or been joined on a supplemental basis.
Id.
55. Charles W. Adams, Recent Amendments Affecting Federal Jurisdiction and Venue, 62
OKLA. B.J. 2365, 2369 (July 27, 1991).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (emphasis added).
57. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b)(a) (West Supp. 1991) ("claims by plaintiffs against persons made
parties under Rule... 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure") (emphasis added).
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (emphasis added).
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to proceed in federal court, but would deny claims by plaintiffs against
nondiverse defendants made parties under Rule 20."
Additionally, section 1367(b) has a significant effect on a landmark
case decided by the Supreme Court in 1860, Freeman v. Howe.60 Freeman permitted ancillary jurisdiction of claims by an additional nondiverse plaintiff based on intervention as of right. 1 It appears that section
1367(b)'s refusal to permit an additional nondiverse plaintiff's intervention of right supercedes Freeman.6 2 Under section 1367(b), intervention
of right, governed by Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
will be denied if original jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship and the addition of the supplemental claim would destroy the re6
quired diversity.

C. 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)
The duty of the district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
in the appropriate circumstances appears mandatory under subsections
(a) and (b). However, the courts are awarded some discretion under subsection (c). Section 1367(c) states:
The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim under subsection (a) if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances,
there are other compelling reasons
64
for declining jurisdiction.
Subsection (c) codifies the factors courts currently recognize as providing a basis for discretionary rejection of supplemental jurisdiction
59. See Adams, supra note 55, at 2370.
60. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,
375 n.18 (1978) ("The ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts derives originally from cases such

as Freeman v. Howe ....

).

61. Freeman, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 460. Intervention as of right is today provided for by Rule
24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
62. Section 1367(b) states in pertinent part:
"In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on
section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under
subsection (a) over claims ... by persons ... seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule
24 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] ...
63. Id.

64. 28 U.S.C.A. 1367(c) (West Supp. 1991).
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claims.6" The catchall language of subsection (c)(4) provides for exceptional cases requiring dismissal for other compelling reasons.
D. 28 USC. §1367(d)
Section 1367(d) prevents the extinguishment of claims while parties
await a supplemental jurisdiction determination. Section 1367(d) states:
The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a),
and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed
at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection
(a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30
days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling
period.66
This subsection precludes the destruction of claims when a state's
statute of limitations does not toll the running of the period of limitations
while a supplemental claim is pending in federal court.' The tolling effect applies not only to the supplemental claim, but to any other claims
in the action as well.68 This provides a plaintiff who has suffered the
dismissal of their supplemental claim with the option of pursuing all the
claims in state court. 69
V.

JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF SECTION 1367

Although appellate level cases interpreting section 1367 are limited
due to its recent enactment, a few district court and appellate cases from
around the country provide some insight into issues the courts will confront when applying section 1367.70 Thus far, courts have faced several
issues, including the interpretation of "same case or controversy,"
whether section 1367 provides the pendent plaintiff with supplemental
jurisdiction, and whether section 1367 allows the attachment of a state
claim to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal civil rights claim.
65. H.R. RPn. No. 101-734, supra note 2, at 29.
66. 28 U.S.C.A. 1367(d) (West Supp. 1991).

67. Id. Oklahoma has a savings statute allowing the tolling of statutes of limitations for one
year following the dismissal of an action other than on its merits. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 100 (1981).
Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) would not be needed in Oklahoma under most circumstances. See Adams, supra note 55, at 2370. If previous dismissal occurred or the first action was filed outside of
Oklahoma, Oklahoma's savings statute may not be used. Therefore, section (d) would provide an
added benefit under these situations.

68. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(d) (West Supp. 1991).
69. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, supra note 2, at 30.
70. Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599 (3rd Cir. 1991); Arnold v. Kimberly Care Nursing
Serv., 762 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Rosen v. Chang, 758 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1991).
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Interpretationof "Same Case or Controversy"

As pointed out earlier, supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 requires that the supplemental claims be "so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."7 1 Prior to the enactment of section 1367, the same transaction
test, established in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,72 governed the requisite relationship between the federal and nonfederal claim for purposes of
exercising pendent jurisdiction.
Gibbs held that pendent jurisdiction exists whenever the relationship
between the federal and state claim is such "that the entire action before
the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.' ,,71 According to
Gibbs, the relationship between the federal and nonfederal claims is sufficient when they "derive from the same nucleus of operative fact" and are
such that a plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
judicial proceeding."'7 4 Courts have interpreted Gibbs as meaning that
pendent jurisdiction is available only when each and every claim arises
from the same transaction.7 5
Technically, section 1367 could expand the limits of the Gibbs' same
transaction test by merely requiring that the nonfederal and federal
claims constitute part of the same "case. "76 The Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure make it acceptable for a case to involve more than one transaction.7 7 According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's view of
"case," it could be argued that section 1367's use of the word "case"
enlarges the supplemental jurisdiction arena by allowing the attachment
of a state claim even though it did not arise from the same transaction as
the federal claim.78 Such an argument is bolstered by the fact that Congress chose the word "case" in spite of a proposal by the Federal Courts
Study Subcommittee which limited supplemental jurisdiction to "all
other claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence." 79
71. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
72. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
73. Id. at 725.

74. Id.
75. See, eg., Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court'sInvitation to Codify
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213, 215, 215 n.14 (1991) (citations omitted).
76. See, Adams, supra note 55, at 2369.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) and 13(b). Rule 18(a) permits the joinder of unrelated claims involving the same parties. Rule 13(b) allows a defendant to assert counterclaims which do not arise from
the same transaction as the plaintiff's claim.
78. See Adams, supra note 55, at 2369.
79. Subcommittee on the Role of Federal Courts and Their Relation to the States, Report to
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Despite the fact that section 1367's use of "case" could technically
include unrelated transactions, courts thus far have clung to the Gibbs'
same transaction test when applying section 1367.80 For example, in Rosen v. Chang,"1 which involved the attachment of a Rhode Island wrong-

ful death claim to a federal civil rights claim,82 the court interpreted
section 1367(a)'s "case or controversy" language by applying the Gibbs'
same transaction test.83 The Rosen court even went as far as concluding
that "[t]he doctrine of pendent jurisdiction delineated in Gibbs has recently been codified ... at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. ''s4
The Gibbs' test was utilized by another court in a subsequent appli-

cation of section 1367, Arnold v. Kimberly Quality Care Nursing Service."

Arnold involved the attachment of a Pennsylvania loss of

consortium claim asserted by an additional plaintiff to a federal Title VII
claim of retaliatory discharge.8 6 The court recognized section 1367(a) as
controlling and proceeded to make a determination whether the loss of

consortium claim was sufficiently related to the Title VII claim that it
formed part of the same case or controversy.8 7 The court found that the

requisite relationship existed, stating that "[s]uch a determination can be
the Federal Courts Study Committee, Part III, Vol. I, 567-68 (1990) cited in Adams, supranote 55,
at 2369 (emphasis added). See Adams, supra note 55, at 2369 (comparing the enacted language to
the language proposed by the Subcommittee on the Role of Federal Courts and Their Relation to the
States).
80. See H.R. REP. No. 101-743, supra note 2, at 29 n.15 (stating that section 1367(a) "codifies
the scope of supplemental jurisdiction first articulated [in] ... Gibbs. . .
81. 758 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1991).
82. Id. The complaint alleged three distinct theories of liability. Count I asserted a claim
against the defendants in their individual and official capacities pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Count
II requested recovery against all defendants, except the State, pursuant to Rhode Island's Wrongful
Death Act. Count III claimed the State was liable for the wrongful conduct of its employees due to
respondeat superior. Each count was addressed individually by the court. The court dismissed
Count I as to the defendants in their official capacities only. Dismissal was warranted because states
and state officials acting in their official capacities simply are not "persons" within the meaning of 42
U.S.C. § 1983. However, the defendants, except for the State, were not awarded dismissal in their
individual capacities. Thus, plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, although confined to defendants'
individual capacities, provided original federal jurisdiction.
83. Id. at 802.
84. Id.
85. 762 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
86. Id. Arnold and her husband filed a lawsuit based upon alleged sexual harassment by defendant Parks, an employee of defendant Kimberly Quality Care Nursing Service. Original federal
jurisdiction was based on a Title VII claim for retaliatory discharge, while the supplemental jurisdiction claim derived from a state law claim for loss of consortium. The Title VII claim damages were
allegedly suffered by plaintiff-wife. The loss of consortium claim damages were allegedly suffered by
plaintiff-husband. The court found that facts which the husband would be required to show in his
loss of consortium claim shared a common nucleus with the operative facts of the wife's Title VII
claim. Id. at 1186.
87. Id. at 1185.
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made under the standard set forth in United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs .... "I"
While Rosen and Arnold are both district court cases, a Third Circuit case, Sinclairv. Soniform, Inc.,9 demonstrates that federal appellate
courts may also follow the trend of performing the Gibbs' test when applying section 1367. The Sinclair court permitted the attachment of state
claims to federal admiralty jurisdiction claims. 90 Sinclair held that
claims are part of the same constitutional case if they pass the Gibbs'
common nucleus of operative facts test.9 1 When required to make the
"case" determination under section 1367, courts simply do not appear
willing to forfeit the familiar Gibbs' test that they have applied for the
last two decades.
B. Pendent PlaintiffJurisdiction under Section 1367
A second issue regarding the application of section 1367 was encountered by the Arnold court.9 2 The defendants in Arnold argued that
section 1367 was not intended to support pendent plaintiff jurisdiction.
In other words, the defendants asserted that section 1367 does not allow
supplemental jurisdiction for a plaintiff, such as Arnold's husband, who
lacked independent federal jurisdiction.9 3
The court disagreed, explaining that the language of section 1367(a)
"is broad enough to include a pendent plaintiff who is named in the original complaint, not just one, as the defendants argue, who may subsequently be joined, or seek to join, or who intervenes." 9 4 Arnold and her
husband were both named as plaintiffs in the original Title VII complaint. The husband was allowed to assert pendent plaintiff status for his
loss of consortium claim.95 The Arnold court supported its interpretation
with reference to Brown v. Grabowski9 6 and Rosen,9 7 which both held
that section 1367(a) provides for pendent party jurisdiction over defendants named in the original complaint.98 Arnold reasoned that the result
88. Id. at 1186 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)).
89. 935 F.2d 599 (3rd Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 600.
91. Id.
92. Arnold v. Kimberly Quality Care Nursing Serv., 762 F. Supp. 1182, 1186 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
93. Id. at 1185.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 922 F.2d 1097 (3rd Cir. 1990) (denying jurisdiction over state claims in civil rights suit),
cerL denied, 111 S.Ct. 2827 (1991).
97. 758 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1991).
98. Arnold, 762 F. Supp. at 1185.
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should be the same for pendent plaintiff jurisdiction.9 9
C. Attaching a State Claim to a 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Federal Civil Rights
Claim

A third issue in the judicial application of section 1367 is the use of
supplemental jurisdiction to attach a state law claim against a state to a
federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action." °° The Rosen court faced
this issue.'
The plaintiff in Rosen attempted to attach a claim against
Rhode Island for the wrongful conduct of its employees (based on the

doctrine of respondeat superior) to a § 1983 civil rights action. 0 2 Rosen
acknowledged that prior case law forbade such an exercise of pendent
jurisdiction. 0 3 The Rosen court held that such prior case law was nullified by section 1367(a)'s grant of pendent party jurisdiction. 0"
VI.

CONCLUSION

Supplemental jurisdiction allows federal courts to prevent the dupli-

cation of efforts between federal and state courts. Arnold and Rosen provide examples of federal district courts seizing the opportunity to
exercise judicial economy by keeping the entire "case" in one court. The
statutory overruling of Finley's prohibition against pendent party juris-

diction represents a solid step towards judicial efficiency. The following
quote demonstrates the desperate need in the federal court system for

reform:
Joinder of parties was pretty well cleaned up in the 1966 revisions of
the Federal Rules. But, substantial difficulties remain in dealing with
controversies that have multistate elements or questions of both state
and federal law, for the rules of jurisdiction over person and over subject matter have not been fully systematized. That is, in various circumstances the system still cannot accomplish the objective of
99. Id.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (civil rights actions) which states in pertinent part: "Every person
who.. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ...to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured ...." (emphasis added).
101. Rosen, 758 F. Supp. at 803-04.
102. Id. at 803
103. Id. (referring to Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) and Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4 (1st
Cir. 1983)). According to the Rosen court, "Both cases stated that in consideration of the fact that
there was no Congressional grant of jurisdiction, Congressional intent to bar § 1983 actions against
the states must be read to indicate that pendent jurisdiction should not be used to allow similar state
law claims." Id. at 803 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 803-04. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) states, "Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties."
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determining all aspects of an ordinary civil controversy in one action.
There is simply no reason why a multiple-claim, multiple-party controversy arising within the United States should not be submissible to a
single tribunal for a consistent adjudication of the various claims and
liabilities. Failure in this objective has the consequences of multiplying
and prolonging litigation, multiplying private and public legal costs,
and bringing the system of justice into unnecessary disrepute. Only a
°
legal technician could admire the system as it is. 105

The enactment of section 1367 takes some of the sting out of the outrage
expressed above. Supplemental jurisdiction alone will not cure judicial

inefficiency. However, section 1367 moves us closer to a system that can
be admired by both the legal technician, and more importantly, the federal court litigant.
Cami Rae Baker
105. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 7, § 10.24, at 582.
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